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ECHOES OF ANTIQUITY THE DOCTRINE OF
CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE AND
THE RULE OF CANON 42
An agreement to support a lawsuit is champertous, according
to the classical definition, when three elements are present. These
are (1) the absence of any interest m the suit other than that
arising from the contract, (2) the assumption of all expenses of con-
ducting the litigation, and (3) an agreement for remuneration out
of the proceeds of the suit.'
Although there has been another North Dakota case skirting
the edge of the question, 2 the North Dakota Supreme Court has
spoken directly to the problem of an attorney agreeing to bear the
expense of litigation on only two occasions, the last one occurring
nearly fifty years ago.3  In the first of these two cases, 4 the
plaintiff's attorney was alleged to have agreed to undertake the
suit at his own expense m return for one-half of the recovery, if
any were had. The defendant urged this agreement as grounds for
dismissal of the suit, but the court, following the traditional rule,
held that champerty may not be raised as a defense by one not
a party to the allegedly champertous agreement. In its discussion
of the agreement, the court expressed doubt that the furnishing of
costs of litigation by an attorney was champertous in North Dakota,
pointing out that the execution of the agreement was not a misde-
meanor under the relevant North Dakota statutes, 6 and that "in
some states it is held that the common law relating to champerty
no longer exists, and that such an agreement is valid unless it
1. 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAw 653 (1914) , 14 C.J.S. Champerty 4 Masntenance §
1 (1939).
2. See Rohn v. Johnson, 33 N.D. 179, 156 N.W 936 (1916).
3. Stark County v. Mischell, 42 N.D. 332, 173 N.W. 817 (1919), Woods v. Walsh, 7
N.D. 376, 75 N.W 767 (1898).
4. Woods v. Walsh, supra.
5. E.g., Hadley v. Platte Valley Cattle Co., 143 Neb. 482, 10 N.W.2d 249 (1943),
Omaha & R. V Ry. v. Brady, 39 Neb. 27, 57 N.W 767 (1894). But see, Kelley v. Kelley,
86 Wis. 170, 56 N.W 637 (1893), where the defendant won a dismissal on the basis of a
champertous agreement between th plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney.
6. RHv. CoDEs oF N. D. §§ 7008, 7013 (1895), which declared that an attorney who
purchased a chose in action or procured a loan to purchase a chose in action was a mis-
demeanor. The language is similar to and the probable import exactly the same as §§
12-17-19, 12-17-21 N.D. CENT. CoDn (1960).
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contravenes some statute."7  The court, however, restricted its
holding to a refusal to allow the defendant to show as a defense
a champertous agreement between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's
attorney
The second case, Stark County v Mischell,8 was an action by
Stark County to recover attorney's fees paid to a former State's
Attorney who had resigned his position as State's Attorney to handle
a claim of the county on a 50 per cent contingent fee basis, with
the costs to be born by the attorney The county sued to recover
the fees paid to the attorney under this agreement. The North Da-
kota court decided in favor of Stark County because of the agree-
ment that the attorney was to bear the costs, saying:
Under the doctrine of champerty, long has been recog-
nized the impropriety of an attorney's speculating m law-
suits, and becoming a gambler in litigation at his own cost.9
Two judges disagreed with the majority's decision that the contract
was champertous. One of these judges, concurring, argued that no
real difference exists between a contingent fee contract and one
under which the attorney will pay the costs and that "[w]ithout
such arrangements there would often be a failure of justice."'20
This note will examine the history of the rule forbidding at-
torneys to bear the costs of litigation and the reasoning behind it in
an effort to determine whether the majority or the minority opinions
in Stark County v Mischell" reached the more reasonable result.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE
Some difference in opinion exists as to the exact origin of the
doctrine of champerty and maintenance. 1 2 Blackstone traced the
doctrine to Roman law, which he said joined him in declaring
champertors to be "pests of civil society."' 3 Another commentator
7. Woods v. Walsh, supra note 3, 7 N.D. at 376.
8. Supra note 3.
9. Stark County v. Mischell, supra note 3, 173 N.W at 820.
10. Stark County v. Mischell, supra note 3, 173 N.W at 821. For the opinion of the
other disagreeing judge, who relied on Woods v. Walsh, supra note 3, see 173 N.W. at 822.
11. Supra note 3.
12. Maintenance differs from champerty only in that there is no agreement to share
in the proceeds of the suit. 4 BLACKSTONE 135 (Lewis' ed. 1897).
13. Ibid.
14. 2 THORNTON, supra note 1, at 557, 558.
15. Opinion of Tindall, C. J., in Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369, 377, 131 All Eng. Rep.
143, 146 (1831).
16. Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N.E. 747, 749 (1892).
17. Stanley v. Jones, supra note 15, 4 BIACKSTONE, supra note 12. See also 1 COKE's
FIRST INSTITUTES 265 a. a n. I (Butler ed. 1817).
18. 2 THORNTON, supra note 1, at 658, Stanley v. Jones, upra note 15.
19. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12. But see Newman v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co.,
372 S.W.2d 410 (Ky.App. 1963).
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claimed that the doctrine was invented in order to protect the newly-
arrived Norman conquerors in their acquisition of Saxon property,
and was strengthened during the reign of Henry VIII when the king
began to escheat the monastery estates in 1538 and to dispossess
the Knights of Malta in 1540.14 Another authority claimed that
champerty "was considered in earlier times, and in all countries,
an offense pregnant with great mischief to the public. ' 15 It has
also been suggested that the doctrine arose in an effort to prevent
powerful nobles from taking transfers of pretended rights in property
and prosecuting them before juries made up of their own tenants,
thus oppressing the weaker landowners. 16
In any event, the doctrine of champerty and maintenance was
closely tied to the now-defunct common law rule against the assign-
ment of a chose in action,'17 and at one time had a considerably
broader impact than it has today The doctrine prohibited all grat-
uitous aid in the litigation of a claim. For example, a witness who
testified without being supoenaed was guilty of maintenance' and
subject to fine and imprisonment at common law ' An exception
to the operation of this rule was allowed, according to Blackstone,
for a man who maintained the suit of a poor kinsman or near
neighbor out of compassion.2" The doctrine was firmly entrenched
in the law courts, but the equity courts may have refused to adopt it.21
By the end of the Eighteenth Century, the doctrine was so well
entrenched that an English court could declare that maintenance
was such a great evil that it was not merely malum prohibitum,
some courts began to mquire into the motivation and circumstances
but was malum in se.2 2 The restrictions on champerty and main-
tenance began to loosen in the first part of the next century as
surrounding an agreement by which someone other than the plain-
tiff was to supply the costs of litigation, 23 although this was by no
means a uniform attitude.2 4  In relaxing the doctrine, the courts
occasionally distinguished between the conduct allowed on the part
20. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12.
21. Compare the opinion of Wilde, J., m Stanley v. Jones, supra note 15 with Hughes
v. Eisner, 8 N.J. Super. 351, 72 A.2d 901, 902 (1950) "[C]ourts of equity from the earliest
times regarded the doctrine as 'absurd' and declined to adopt it."
22. Walils v. Duke of Portland, 3 Ves. 494, 30 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1797).
23. "The law of maintenance, as I understand it upon the modern constructions, is con-
fined to cases where a man improperly, and for the purpose of stirring up strife, encour-
ages others either to bring actions, or make defenses which they have no right to make
if a man were to see a poor person in the street oppressed and abused, and without means
of obtaining redress for his wrongs, and furnished him with money or employed an at-
torney to obtain redress for his wrongs, it would require a stronge argument to convince
me that that man could be said to be stirring up litigation and strife. Findon v.
Parker, 11 M. & W 676, 682, 152 Eng. Rep. 977, 979 (1843).
24. See, e.g., Bradlaugh v. Newgate, 11 Q.B.D. 1 (1883), in which Lord Coleridge strug-
gled with the suggestion from an Indian case that the existance of maintenance depended
on immorality of conduct. He resolved the dilemma by deciding that what was meant was
immorality in a legal sense, which existed whenever the conduct violated a legal rule.
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of attorneys and that expected of other persons, and exhibited a
tendency to apply the traditional rules more strictly to attorneys.2 5
Although the obsolescence of the rule against aiding a litigant by
paying the costs of the litigation began to be recognized over fifty
years ago, 26 some English courts feel bound by the traditional rule
and the weight of precedent behind it, regardless of their disagree-
ment with the validity of applying the rule in the modern context. 27
The American courts generally recognized the doctrine of champ-
erty and maintenance as a part of the common law, but normally
accompanied their recognition with a statement to the effect that
the conditions in this country differ from those which gave rise
to the doctrine in England.28 The theoretical relaxation of the rule
against champertous contracts in the United States included the
acceptance of the proposition that such agreements are not malum
in se, but merely malum prohibitum,29 with the practical result
that an attorney who sued on a champertous contract was allowed
to recover on a quantum meruit basis for his services, even though
he was demed enforcement of the contract itself.2 0  At least one
early decision, however, declared champertous agreements to be "so
odious in the eyes of the law" that the court would not aid a party
to such an agreement to recover money paid out under it. 1
New Jersey has consistently refused to apply the doctrine of
champerty and maintenance, 32 with the result that the New Jersey
courts are free to weigh the reasonableness of an agreement which
would otherwise be champertous,3 3 while other states, although rea-
lizing that they are applying an antiquated rule which is not par-
ticularly promotive of justice, do not feel free to examine the con-
text of an individual agreement." West Virginia has reached es-
25. See A Solicitor Ex parte The Law Society, 1 K.B. 302, [1911-13] All E.R. 202, 206
(1911), Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. Jun. 120 34 Eng. Rep. 263, 266 (1811).
26. See British Cash & Parcel Conveyors v. Lamson Service Co., 1908(1) K.B. 1006,
1013.
27. "I wish that we could have held that to maintain a party in litigation is only
wrongful where there Is something in the nature of a conspiracy between the maintained
party and the maintainer to defeat, rather than to further, the ends of justice." The judge
writing these words felt constrained to hold otherwise by the weight of precedent. Martell
v. Consett Iron Co., Ltd., [1955] All E.R. 481.
28. E.g., Gilman v. Jones, 87 Ala. 691, 5 So. 785 (1889), Boardman & Brown v. Thomp-
son, 25 Iowa 787 (1868) , Rohan v. Johnson, 33 N.D. 179, 166 N.W. 936 (1916).
29. Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571 (1922).
30. Watkins v. Sedberry, supra note 29, Dombey v. Detroit, T. & I. R, 351 F.2d 121
(6th Cir. 1965) , Application of Kamerman, 278 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1960), J.B.P Holding
Corp. V. United States, 166 F.Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 545 (1932).
31. Wheeler v. Pounds, 24 Ala. 472, 473 (1854).
32. Sweeney v. Venziano, 70 N.J.Super. 185, 175 A.2d 241 (1961), Hughes v. Eisner,
supra note 21. See also Bouvier v. Baltimore & N.Y. Ry., 67 N.J. 281, 51 A. 781 (1902).
33. Hughes v. Eisner, aupra note 21, at 903, 904.
Mo.Avp. 246, 157 S.W. 122 (1914).
34. Boardman v. Brown & Thempson, supra note 28 at 506, 507, Taylor v. Perkins, 171
Mo. App. 246, 157 S.W. 122 (1914).
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sentially the same result as New Jersey through a little different
formulation. The Supreme Court of that state has declared that
since the doctrine of champerty is ordinarily not consonant with
modern statutes and decisions, it will invoke the doctrine only when
it is equitable to do soA5 New York apparently allows an attorney
to defend a suit at his own expense, 8 but not to represent a
plaintiff under such an agreement. 7 In Oregon, two laymen may
make an agreement whereby one will assist the other in the pro-
secution of a suit.38 The court did indicate that such agreements
would be carefully scrutinized to avoid speculation in lawsuits, and
that a different result might be reached if an attorney were a party
to the contract.8 9 An Alabama court recently decided to uphold an
allegedly champertous contract, reasoning that no public policy
should require the court to allow the avoidance of the terms of a
fair and reasonable agreement.40
Reece v Kyle,41 involved an agreement by an attorney to pay
half the cost of litigation of a claim in return for half the recovery
if the suit was successful. The client was financially unable to
carry on the suit by himself and no charge of fraud or undue ad-
vantage was made. The Ohio court held that the contract was not
invalid for champerty The court said that it violated no public
policy to represent a client, knowing that he will be unable to pay
the costs of the suit unless it is successful and "[t]hat contracts
similar to the one at bar were regarded as dangerous three or
four hundred years ago is not a powerful reason for so regarding
them now "42 Ohio may have retreated from the Reece case
not long ago when an Ohio attorney was suspended from the prac-
tice of law for, among other things, advancing money for living
expenses to indigent clients. The court held this to be the purchase
of an interest in litigation.4 3 Both the concurring and the dissenting
opinions relied on Reece v Kyle. The Supreme Court of Illinois,
however, in People v McCallum,4 refused to disbar an attorney
because he had advanced money for living expenses to indigent
clients. The court said:
The practice of advancing money to the injured client with
which to pay hospital bills during the pendency of the case
may in a sense tend to foment litigation by preventing an
unjust settlement from necessity, but we are aware of no
35. Work v. Rogerson, 149 WVa. 493, 142 S.E.2d 188 (1965).
36. Fowler v. Calion, 102 N.Y. 395, 7 N.E. 169 (1886).
37. In re Gilman, 251 N.Y. 265, 167 N.E. 434 (1929).
38. Brown v. Blgue, 21 Ore. 260, 28 Pac. 11 (1891).
39. See Dahms v. Sears, 13 Ore. 47, 11 Pa. 891 (1886).
40. Lott V. Kees, 276 Ala. 556, 165 So.2d 106 (1964).
41. 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N.E. 747 (1892).
42. Supra, 31 N.E. at 750.
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authority holding that it is against public policy or of any
sound reason why it should be so considered. 5
The attitude of a court toward the doctrine of champerty and
maintenance may be reflected in reluctance to construe an ambig-
uous contract as containing a champertous provision. In Clancy v
Kelly, 6 an agreement whereby the attorney was to advance the
costs of the suit, but was to be repaid was held not to be champertous
even though no provision was included as to when or how the re-
payment was to be made. The court's construction contradicted a
jury verdict adverse to the attorney 47 An even more obvious case
is Gray v Bemls,4 18 a Minnesota case in which the agreement to be
construed called for the attorney to receive a thirty per cent share
of any recovery, and, if no recovery was had "then we [clients]
.are to be at no expense whatever-49 The court construed the
quoted language to mean that in the event that no recovery was
had, the attorney would charge no fee, but the clients would still be
responsible for the costs of the suit.
The the doctrine of champerty and maintenance, although still
recognized in a formal sense, is being eroded in the United States
in its practical significance.
CANON 42
Despite the evidence that the doctrine of champerty in general,
and the rule against allowing the attorney to furnish the costs of
suit m particular, has lost a great deal of favor, Canon 42 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics still reads:
A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the
lawyer shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may
in good faith advance expenses as a matter of convenience,
but subject to reimbursement. 50
The constructions and opinions of Association of the Bar of the City
of New York based on Canon 42, however, may reflect a trend
toward a more realistic approach to the issue. In 1939, that body
declared:
The fact that some lawyers assume not only taxable
43. Mahoning County Bar v. Euffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396 (1964).
44. 341 I1. 578, 173 N.E. 827 (1930).
45. Supra, 173 N.E. at 831.
46. 182 Iowa 1207, 166 N.W 583 (1918).
47. See supra, 166 N.W at 583-85.
48. 128 Minn. 392, 151 N.W 135 (1915).
49. Supra, 151 N.W at 136.
50. CROMWELL FOUNDATION, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 849 (1956).
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costs but also the expense of retaining expert witnesses,
such as doctors, accountants, and appraisers, with no intent
to seek reimbursement from their clients and will continue
to do so, irrespective of the opinions of Committees on Pro-
fessional Ethics, does not deter this Committee from strongly
condemning the practice.
5
1
Five years later, an opinion allowed an attorney to furnish the
costs of appeal when his client was unable to do so, 52 although the
Committee still ruled otherwise when the client refused to pay the
costs of an appeal without a statement of financial inability 58
In 1946, the New York Association was required to referee a
collision between the antiquated rule embodied in Canon 42 and a
regulation developed to meet a more contemporaneous problem. The
Secretary of Interior, who was required to approve all contracts
between attorneys and Indian tribes, refused to approve an arrange-
ment for representation before the Indian Claims Commission un-
less the attorney's reimbursement for expenses was contingent upon
recovery The Committee dcided that they would approve this ar-
rangement, since to do otherwise would deprive the Indians of repre-
sentation. 54 Although their decision was called a "construction" of
Canon 42, it seems apparent that the Committee realized that Canon
42 did not offer a valid contemporary solution to the problem.
The Canons of Ethics have been characterized as "generaliza-
tions designed for an earlier era." 55 Canon 42 certainly fits this
description. It is derived from a doctrine which was designed pri-
marily to meet one of the socio-economic problems of medieval
England. It is a generalization, the application of which is not well
suited to achieving desirable results in a systematic manner One
of the prime responsibilities of the legal profession is to make the
law available to the common man. 5 As the technological base of
our culture expands and the knowledge of the individual becomes
more compartmentalized, the cost of successfully litigating a claim
greatly increases because of the need for expert testimony 57 This
change alone requires a re-evaluation of Canon 42 to prevent plac-
ing the courts entirely out of reach of the ordinary litigant, who is
51. Id. at 259.
52. Id. at 374.
53. Id. at 379.
54. Id. at 401.
55. Stone, The Pullic Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. Rv. 1, 10 (1934).
56. Id. at 8.
57. For example, how could a plaintiff prove that "chronologically and etiologically
[the plaintiff's] condition is traced directly to the Quadrigen administered to him October
1st, 1959," without procuring expensive expert testimony. See Stromsodt v. Park-Davis and
Co., 257 F.Supp. 991, 994 (D.N.D. 1966).
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oppressed enough by the slowness and costliness of our judicial
system.58
Certainly, the attorney should not advance the costs of litiga-
tion to all clients, and some validity remains to the policy of res-
training speculation in lawsuits. It would seem, however, that a
more Ingenious method of articulating that policy might be found
than that utilized in Canon 42. A rule forbidding speculation in
lawsuits would have some merit; a blanket formulation against an
attorney supplying the costs of litigation is, at best, obtuse, and,
at worst, obstructionist.
"Facts are stubborn but revealing things, and the first step
toward any form of social improvement is a frank recognition of
them." 59 As now expressed, Canon 42 gives three choices to an
attorney whose client's case requires expenses beyond the client's
means. He may refuse to represent the client. He may agree to
represent the client, but prepare the case in a less than adequate
fashion, with the result that the client's grievance is not adequately
presented and the court is required to make a decision without being
fully informed. Thirdly, the attorney may decide to ignore Canon
42. None of the alternatives are promotive of either justice or
ethics.
CONCLUSION
Congress, by authorizing the federal courts to provide in forma
pauperis procedures whereby a party may escape prepayment of
fees and costs by making an affidavit that he is unable to give
security for such costs, has impliedly recognized the obsolescence of
the rule requiring a litigant to be able to pay his costs independent
of a judgment.60 Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Secre-
tary of Labor is authorized to bring suit on behalf of an employee
against his employer for underpayment of wages.61 Not only may
the Secretary conduct the suit on behalf of the employees, he may
also take the initial step of advising the employee that he "had not
been paid the wages required by the Act and that on written re-
quest from the employee the Secretary could file a suit."6 2
Thus Congress has determined that the facts of modern society may
demand actions which, if undertaken by an attorney, would amount
to "the barratrous stirring up of litigation" at common law s8
58. See generally, BRENNAN, THB COST OP THE AmRICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1966).
59. Stone, supra note 55, at 7.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964), § 1825 (1965 Supp.). A person need not be completely un-
able to support himself before this procedure is available to him. SeJeck v. Singer, ,13
F.Supp. 281 (1953). See also Adkins v. DuPont Co., 335 U.S. 831 (1948).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 216 (a) (1964).
62. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 721, 727 (1961).
63. Ibid.
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NOTES
Another indication of the obsolescence of the doctrine of champ-
erty and maintenance is the context in which it was last used with
a deliberate social purpose. After the Supreme Court announced its
decision that racially segregated schools were unconstitutional,6"
Virginia and six other states5 enacted statutes strengthening the
doctrine of champerty and maintenance in an effort to prevent the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from
advising and financially aiding Negroes in getting legal assistance.
The Supreme Court declared the Virginia statute to be unconstitu-
tional in 1963,66 and appeared to support an inquiry into the intent
factor before the doctrine of champerty and maintenance should be
invoked.6 7
The effectiveness of the doctrine as a guard against ground-
less suits has been surpassed since its invention by the development
of statutes for the limitation of actions, a cause of action for malicious
prosecution and the assessment of costs against losing parties, 6
especially since, by the majority rule, the party sued cannot in-
voke a champertous agreement between the plaintiff and the plain-
tiff's attorney as a defense. 69 The effect of the rule is that a
party may keep a judgment won through the agreement of his
attorney to pay the costs of litigation, and then refuse to pay the
attorney his agreed-upon fee. It seems plain that the doctrine of
champerty and maintenance, at least insofar as it forbids the pay-
ment of costs of litigation by the attorney, has outlived the con-
ditions which it was designed to meet and should be abandoned.
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64. Brown v. Board of Education, 34? U.S. 483 (1954).
65. Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina and Tennessee.
66. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See also N.A.A.C.P v. Harrison, 102 Va.
142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960).
67. The Court indulged in an uninhibited interpretation of history, saying' "Malicious
intent was of the essence of the common-law offenses of maintaining or stirring up liti-
gation." N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra, at 489.
68. Hovey v. Hobson, 51 Me. 62 (1863).
69. Hadley v. Platte Valley Cattle Co., 143 Neb. 482, 10 N.W.2d 249 (1943) Lanz v.
Naddy, 82 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1957), Work v. Rogerson, 149 WVa. 493, 142 S.E.2d 188
(1965). But see Kelley v. Kelley, 86 Wis. 170, 56 N.W. 637 (1893).
